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JUDICIAL OVERLOAD:
THE REASONS AND THE REMEDIES
MARIA L. MARCUS*
In Utopia,
They have no lawyers among them, for they consider them...
people whose profession it is to disguise matters.
Sir Thomas More, Utopia, Bk. 2.
A nimosity towards lawyers, perennial in our social history long
before Watergate, parallels a contradictory and equally per-
sistent belief in judges as problem-solvers for a variety of personal,
economic, educational and political ills. An increasing number of
litigants are bringing to the courts not only the class of disputes
that has been the traditional fare of judicial decision-making, but
also an array of issues that were formerly resolved in private meet-
ings, at hospitals, in schools, or at home. The causes of this
explosion of lawsuits and the possible buffers to an eventual
implosion in our judicial system will be discussed below.'
I. PUBLIC RESORT TO THE COURTS
A. The Numerical Rise in Court Caseloads
The raw data on caseload increases are dramatic but sometimes
ambiguous. In 1951, 1,200 new cases were filed in the United States
Supreme Court; by 1971, the number had reached 3,600.2 A
committee of the Federal Judicial Center, citing this threefold
increase, concluded that "the conditions essential for the per-
formance of the [Supreme] Court's mission do not exist." a
0 Associate Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law; formerly Assistant
Attorney General of New York State, Chief of Litigation Bureau, and Adjunct Associate
Professor of Law, New York University Law School. This article was written with the aid
of a research grant from New York University Law School. The author acknowledges with
gratitude the valuable research assistance of Kenneth B. Clark, a former student at New
York University Law School.
1. This article will focus on civil litigation, rather than criminal prosecutions. The
latter encompass an array of factors that have no relevance to civil matters, such as the
necessity of imposing sentences as a method of deterrence and isolation of offenders.
2. COMMISSION ON REVIsION OF THE FEDERAL COURT APPELLATE SYSTEm, STRUCTURE AND
INTERNAL PROCEDURS: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE 5 (1975).
3. FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, REPORT OF THE STUDY GROUP ON THE CASELOAD OF THE
SUPREME COURT 5 (1972) [hereinafter cited as FmUND REPORT]. The Study Group, headed
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Former Chief Justice Earl Warren retorted with uncharacter-
istic sarcasm to this reading of the statistics, condemning it as "a
facile and unevaluated use of numbers, reminiscent of the Mc-
Carthy days." 4Justice Warren believed that counting the number
of petitions submitted during the course of a term gave no satis-
factory indication of the actual work involved:
To begin with, about 2000 of those applications, or more than half
the total number, were filed in forma pauperis, mainly by prisoners
on their own behalf... The overwhelming majority of them are
totally and obviously without merit for certiorari purposes, and
little time is or need be expended in disposing of such applica-
tions ....
Additionally, it is fair to estimate that more than half of the other
portion of the certiorari docket, the paid applications that totalled
some 1700 in the 1971 term, were equally without certiorari merit
and were doubtless denied with a minimum expenditure of the
Justices', time and effort.5
Whether the expenditure of effort is minimal or not, the fact
remains that the Supreme Court has continued to give plenary
review to the same number of cases per year. The average number
of opinions for each individual justice is about twelve per term.0
Approximately 150 cases were heard on the merits in 1925 and
in 1971.
by Professor Paul A. Freund, advocated the establishment of a new National Court of
Appeals composed of seven federal circuit judges assigned to three-year staggered terms. Id.
at 47. The National Court would screen all petitions filed for Supreme Court certiorari
review and would retain the power to deny any such applications.
4. Warren, The Proposed New 'National Court of Appeals,' 28 REcoRD OF T"r ASS'N
OF TrHE BAR OF THE Crry oF NEw YoRK 627, 632 (1973) (discussing the proposal of the
FREUND REPORT). It was expected that the proposed National Court of Appeals would
pass on to the Supreme Court perhaps 400 to 500 petitions, out of which about 150 would
be chosen for plenary review. Freund, A National Court of Appeals, 25 HASTsNGs L.J. 1301,
1307 (1974). Thus, 90%0 of the petitions addressed to the Supreme Court would not survive
screening by the National Court of Appeals.
For a discussion of the arguments in favor of a National Court of Appeals, such as
the deficiencies of other approaches to reducing the Supreme Court's caseload and the
advantages of a National Court performing a screening function, see Freund, Why We
Need the National Court of Appeals, 59 A.B.A.J. 247 (1973); Freund, A National Court
of Appeals, 25 HAsTNGs L.J. 1301 (1974). These views are countered in, e.g., Black, The
National Court of Appeals: An Unwise Proppsal, 83 YA=E LJ. 883 (1974); Brennan, The
National Court of Appeals: Another Dissent, 40 U. CHz. L. REV. 473 (1973); Friendly,
Averting the Flood by Lessening the Flow, 59 CORNELL L. REv. 634 (1974); Poe, Schmidt &
Whalen, National Court of Appeals: A Dissenting View, 67 Nw. U.L. REv. 842 (1973).
5. Warren, supra note 4, at 632-33.
6. Id. at 634.
7. Griswold, Rationing Justice-The Supreme Court's Caseload and What the Court
Does Not Do, 60 CORNELL L. REv. 335, 339 (1975). There has been a decline in signed
opinions, however, from 187 in 1935 to 140 in 1971. FREUND REPORT, supra note 3, at A7.
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The lower courts lack the advantage of declining review. In
fiscal year 1960, a total of 3,899 appeals were filed in all eleven
federal circuit courts: with 69 authorized judgeships, the average
was 57 case appeals per judge. By 1973, the average per judgeship
was 161.8 The backlog of pending cases in 1975 stood at 12,128
appeals, 658 greater than at the end of the prior year.9 The federal
district courts fared no better. From 1902 to 1972, the absolute
number of cases filed rose nearly 500%.' 0 In one year, from 1974-
1975, the court caseload increased by 11.7%. 11 These figures repre-
sent a substantial increase in the actual workload of the lower
federal courts.
The New York State courts show a similar trend. Reports of
the civil terms of the New York Supreme Court indicate that
during the period 1956 to 1975-1976 there was a 116.8% increase
in the number of cases received in the state as a whole.' 2
B. The Judiciary's Impact
The figures are arresting; however, we can assess their signifi-
cance only in the context of the judiciary's impact on our personal
and national interests. This context not only confirms the impor-
tance of protecting the courts from becoming a harried bureauc-
racy, but also demonstrates the causal relationship between high
visibility of court action and increasing public resort to the
judiciary as a prime problem-solver.
8. S. REP. No. 742, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1974).
9. [19 76] ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF TM UNITED STATES COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT OF
THE DIRECrOR 153 (Table 1). The data do not indicate the percentage of these cases actually
ready for trial or summary disposition.
10. Grossman & Sarat, Litigation in the Federal Courts: A Comparative Perspective,
9 LAw & Soc'y Rav. 321, 333 (1975).
11. [1975] ADMINISTRATIVE OFFIcE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE
DIRECrOR 191. In addition to sheer number of cases, individual lawsuits-particularly in
the antitrust area-may take months or even years of judicial time. President Carter, by
Executive Order No. 12,022, has established the National Commission for the Review of
Antitrust Laws and Procedures, which will focus on ways to facilitate a more rapid resolu-
tion of such cases, including creation of a special roster of judges, judicial sanctions against
dilatory practices and non-judicial alternatives for disposition. Exec. Order No. 12,022,
42 Fed. Reg. 61,441 (1977).
12. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE STATE OF NEw YORx, FIRST ANNUAL REPORT 54-55
(1956). Appendix B, Table 5 indicates that 53,274 cases were received in 1956. JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE AND OFFICE OF COURT ADMINISTRATION, REPORT OF THE ADMINISRATIVE BOARD
OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, NEW YORK LEG. Doc. No. 90, at 66-67 (1976). Table 25 in-
dicates that 115,514 cases were received during the 1975-1976 period.
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Court rulings are only one species in the vast universe of
decisions that affect us.13 Judicial decisions, however, have the
advantage of accessibility. Judges are expected to give a reasoned
explanation of the process by which they reach their conclusions.
These explanations, most of which are published by the National
Reporter System and available for quotation in the press, have an
aura of finality, of authoritative disposition of the issues at stake.
The popular view that law is what the courts do, and what
judges say it is, is enhanced by the judicial presence in virtually
every area of human concern. 14 Professor Archibald Cox has com-
mented that the Supreme Court's school desegregation decision
in Brown v. Board of Education 15 and its progeny "overturned not
only the constitutional precedents built up over three-quarters of a
century but the social structure of an entire region." "I
The historic reapportionment decision in Baker v. Carr,17 rul-
ing that plaintiffs were entitled to a trial on their claim that a
Tennessee statute "debased" their votes and therefore denied them
equal protection of the laws, put the courts into the position of
restructuring and supervising America's electoral schemes.',
Walking a dimly marked line between the rights of the mother
and the "potentiality of human life," the Court in Roe v. Wade 19
held that the guarantee of privacy contained in the Constitution
includes fundamental personal rights such as a woman's decision
to have an abortion. The ruling distinguished between the first
trimester of pregnancy, when the abortion decision must be left
to the medical judgment of the attending physician in consultation
13. It is Congress that has the right to impose taxes, to declare war, to raise and
support armies, to regulate commerce. U.S. CoNsr. art. I. It is the President who com-
mands our armed forces, our foreign relations, our federal bureaucracy. U.S. CONST. art. 1I.
These governmental powers are often outside the judicial orbit. See, e.g., Dorsen, Separa-
tion of Powers and Federalism, 41 A.B. L. REv. 53, 61-62 (1977). Power is also exercised
by private corporations and influences the prices of commodities ranging from steel to
steak.
14. Lamb, Judicial Policy-Making and Information Flow to the Supreme Court, 29
VANO. L. REv. 45, 46 (1976); cf. Rosenberg, Devising Procedures that are Civil to Promote
Justice that is Civilized, 69 MCH. L. REv. 797, 810 (1971) (courts have the tendency to
take on the most explosive issues of society).
15. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
16. A. Cox, Tirm Rore OF THE SuPREaE COURT IN AmERICAN GOVERNMiENT 100 (1976).
Less dramatic but also significantly affecting the nation's educational policies was the
Court's decision in Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975), which held that students facing
temporary suspension from a public school retain liberty and property interests that merit
protection under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 574-76.
17. 369 U.S. 186 (1962). See also Westbury v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
18. 369 U.S. at 237.
19. 410 U.S. 113, 152-54 (1973).
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with his patient, and the middle and last trimesters, where the
state's interest in protecting the health of the mother and the
viability of the fetus was viewed as greater. °
Litigation appears to be expanding on an ad hoc basis in
response to numerous social and economic controversies. The
Supreme Court's rulings in criminal law, welfare and juvenile
rights continually redefine the individual's relation to the govern-
ment.21 Lower court decisions have also had a substantial impact
in diverse fields ranging from prison administration to forestry. 2
20. Id. at 163-65.
21. See, e.g., Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972) (defendant not entitled to counsel
in police station showups that take place prior to indictment); United States v. Wade,
388 US. 218 (1967) (courtroom identifications of an accused at trial must be excluded if
the accused was exhibited to the witness at a post-indictment lineup without counsel);
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (prosecution may not use statements by defendant
made during custodial interrogation, unless it shows the use of procedural warnings de-
signed to protect against self-incrimination).
In the area of welfare and juvenile rights, see, e.g., Smith v. Organization of Foster
Families, 431 U.S. 816 (1976) (New York procedures for removal of foster children from
foster homes do not violate due process and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth
amendment); McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971) (due process does not require
jury trial for juveniles); Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 809 (1971) (welfare caseworker's home
visitation, required as a condition for public assistance under New York AFDC program,
was not an unreasonable search under the fourth and fourteenth amendments); Goldberg
v. Kelly, 897 U.S. 254 (1970) (state termination of public assistance payments without
affording recipients the opportunity of a hearing violates the due process clause); Shapiro
v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (imposition of residency requirements as a condition
of welfare eligibility violates the equal protection clause); In re Gault, 887 U.S. 1 (1967)
(at the adjudicatory stage when proceedings may result in commitment to a state insti-
tution, juveniles have the right to notice of charges, right to counsel, right to confront
witnesses, and the privilege against self-incrimination).
22. A federal district court in James v. Wallace, 406 F. Supp. 318 (M.D. Ala. 1976),
aff'd and mod. sub nom. Newman v. State, 559 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1977), declared Alabama's
entire prison system violative of the eighth amendment's prohibition against cruel and
unusual punishment and ordered prison officials to commence immediate upgrading of
inhuman living conditions at the institutions. See also Hamilton v. Schiro, 38 F. Supp.
1016 (E.D. La. 1970), relief ordered sub nom. Hamilton v. Landrieu, 351 F. Supp. 549
(E.D. La. 1972) (conditions in Orleans Parish Prison constitute cruel and unusual punish-
ment; upgrading of conditions ordered); Hamilton v. Love, 328 F. Supp. 1182 (E.D. Ark.
1971), contempt motion granted, 858 F. Supp. 38 (E.D. Ark. 1973), contempt citation
revoked, 861 F. Supp. 1235 (E.D. Ark. 1973) (conditions in Arkansas jail deprived persons
of civil rights; standards promulgated). Courts have ordered that bilingual education must
be provided to Mexican-American children, Serna v. Portales Municipal Schools, 499 F.2d
1147 (10th Cir. 1974), and that the federal forestry service may not ciear-cut timber in a
national forest. West Va. Div. of Izaac Walton League of America, Inc. v. Butz, 367 F. Supp.
422 (W.D. W. Va. 1973), afJ'd, 522 F.2d 945 (4th Cir. 1975). The United States Department
of Agriculture was ordered to spend appropriated money and draft regulations needed to
establish a Womens, Infants, Childrens (WIG) program, which would provide nutritious
meals and regular medical screenings to low-income pregnant mothers and to children up
to the age of five. The program served up to 550,000 children and mothers each month.
Dotson v. Butz (D.D.C. 1973) (unreported), noted in COUNCIL FOR PUBLIC INTEREST LAw,




C. Some Novel Areas of Judicial Consideration
Litigation presents infinite possibilities for pouring old wine
into new bottles. A few examples are illustrative.
The United States District Court in Connecticut was recently
asked to adjudicate charges that some male faculty members at
Yale University have subjected female students to sexual harass-
ment and intimidation, and that Yale's refusal to institute mechan-
isms to investigate such harassment denies equal educational
opportunity, therefore violating Title IX of the Education Amend-
ments of 19 7 2 .2' Plaintiffs in Alexander v. Yale University 24
brought suit on behalf of a class composed of four present and
former undergraduate women and a male teacher. The action was
unusual because of its premise that the sexual conduct of professors
at a private educational institution, albeit an institution receiving
federal financial assistance, may subject the university to the juris-
diction of the federal courts. 5
The unique aspect of the lawsuit, however, was its initiation.
The complaint stated that traditional approaches, such as con-
ferences with the administration, had failed. The institution of
new procedures tailored to the problem, usually a rather painless
method of dealing with student grievances, was rejected by the
University. Self-help through class boycotts was apparently not
attempted. Instead, reliance was placed on the judiciary to frame
orders requiring the University to establish appropriate adminis-
trative mechanisms and to take appropriate disciplinary action
against two named professors.
A recent Kansas lawsuit pitted parents as plaintiffs against
their daughter and her future mother-in-law. Plaintiffs, alleging
that they were aggrieved because their names were included on
their twenty-year-old daughter's wedding invitations without their
consent, sued for $10,000 in damages and a court order directing
defendants to notify everyone receiving an invitation that the
parents' name should not have been included. "I wanted to teach
23. 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1976).
24. No. 77-277 (D. Conn., filed July 6,1977).
25. The female plaintiffs alleged that they were subject to a "discriminatory atmo.
sphere adverse to their educational development created by the practice of such sexual
harassment." The basis for joinder of the male professor as plaintiff was that "the
atmosphere of distrust of male professors engendered by the reputation of certain male
professors for sexually harrassing women students" created a barrier to their own teaching.
(Complaint at 3, 8-9).
[Vol. 28
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them a lesson," the father explained. "Right is right, wrong is
wrong, and love comes third, if that's what it is." 26
Judicial aid was also sought by a man who had been excom-
municated by the Reformed Mennonite Church, and as a result
was being "shunned" by all the members of the church, including
his wife and children. Although the lower court had ruled that
the first amendment's guarantee of free exercise of religion pre-
cluded interference with the church's tenets and practices, the
appellate court reversed and directed that plaintiff was entitled to
an opportunity to proceed with his action in equity. Plaintiff
claimed that his family would not speak to him or have any
contact with him, and that other members of the church would
not conduct any business with him. The court found that since the
state had an interest in protecting the marriage relationship and
preventing "tortious" interference in business matters, judicial
regulation of the church's "shunning" policies was permissible.28
That the judiciary has been summoned into such diverse and
far-ranging areas illustrates the source of its constantly increasing
caseload. However, it also indicates the connection between the
visibility of court decisions and the public's choice of judges as the
most effective recourse in social and economic disputes.
D. Effect of the Workload on Judicial Administration and
Litigants
In describing the judicial process, Cardozo noted that some
judges view their duty as nothing more than matching the colors
26. N.Y. Times, Sept. 2, 1977, § A, at 12, cols. 5-6. In another novel suit, judicial
assistance was invoked by an unmarried person for support payments and property rights
previously associated solely with marital obligations. In Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d 660,
665, 557 P.2d 106, 110, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815, 819 (1976), the California Supreme Court held
that singer Michelle Triola could bring claims for such rights against actor Lee Marvin,
with whom she had lived for seven years. The court found that express contracts between
unmarried persons should be enforced by the courts, unless the contract is explicitly based
on meretricious sexual services. Even if there is no express contract, the courts should
determine whether the parties' conduct gives rise to an implied contract, agreement of
partnership, or joint venture. In explaining its broadening of marital rights under the
common law, the court adopted the presumption that the parties had intended to deal
fairly with each other, and noted further: "The mores of the society have indeed changed
so radically in regard to cohabitation that we cannot impose a standard based on alleged
moral considerations that have . . . been so widely abandoned . Id. at 684, 557 P.2d
at 122, 134 Cal. ,ptr. at 831.
27. Bear v. Reformed Mennonite Church, 462 Pa. 330, 341 A.2d 102 (1975).
28. Id. at 834-35, 341 A.2d 107-08. For other cases involving inroads into the affairs of
religious groups, see, e.g., Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese for the United States and
Canada v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976), rev'g 60 Ill. 2d 477, 328 N.E.2d 268 (1973);
Holiman v. Dovers, 236 Ark. 211, 366 S.W.2d 197 (1963); Brown v. Mt. Olive Baptist
Church, 255 Iowa 857, 124 N.W.2d 445 (1963).
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of an array of sample cases spread out on their desks. The sample
closest in shade would supply the rule. "But, of course, no system
of living law can be evolved by such a process. . . It is when
the colors do not match, when the references in the index fail,
when there is no decisive precedent, that the serious business of
the judge begins." 29 It is the act of deliberation, essential in
distinguishing the judiciary from a bureaucracy of case-processors,
that is threatened by the rise in caseloads.2 0
Almost a third of the cases in the federal appellate courts are
presently being decided without the opportunity for oral argument,
and approximately the same percentage are delivered without
opinion.2 1 In an extensive survey of attorneys, respondents were
emphatic in affirming the importance of oral argument as a part
of the effective representation of their clients.32 The lack of an
opinion in numerous cases deprives litigants in similar contro-
versies of the benefit of the court's guidance, and may indeed
proliferate disputes that would otherwise have been settled by a
full interpretation of the legal question at issue.8
The increasing volume in itself has caused the former Chief
Judge of the Second Circuit, Henry J. Friendly, to state that "the
inferior federal courts, and indeed the Supreme Court as well,
are faced with the prospect of a breakdown," 24 and that "[t]he
[federal] courts of appeals are already in a state of crisis." 8 A
simplistic but nonetheless sobering extrapolation from the federal
data suggests that by the commencement of the 21st century, the
federal appeals courts will decide one million cases per year, there
will be over 5,000 federal judges, and the federal reporter system
will expand by more than 1,000 volumes per year.30 More refined
predictions should be based on a sophisticated subject-by-subject
analysis.37 Nevertheless, the data signal a continual overall increase
in cases filed.
29. B. CARDOzO, Tim NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 20-21 (1921).
0o. See REPORT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE COMMITrEE ON REVISIONS OF THE
FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEMq, THE NEEDS OF THE FEDERAL COURTS 4 (1977) [hereinafter cited as
REP. ON REV. FED. JUD. SYS.].
31. Id. at 3.
32. COACMISSION ON REVISION OF THE FEDERAL COURT APPELLATE SYSTEM, STRucruRE
AND INTERNAL PROCEDURES: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE-A PRELIMINARY REPORT 56-57
(1975) [hereinafter cited as COMM'N ON REV. PRELIM. REP.].
33. See, e.g., Currie & Goodman, Judicial Re-iew of Federal Administrative Action:
Quest for the Optimum Forum, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 13 (1975).
34. H. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTON: A GENERAL VIEw 3 (1973).
35. Id. at 31.
36. Barton, Behind the Legal Explosion, 27 STAN. L. REv. 567, 567 (1975).
37. Currie & Goodman, supra note 33, at 63; see Hager, Access to Justice: Whether
Courts are Best Place to Settle Many Disputes, 35 CoNG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 1229, 1234
[Vol. 28
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In turn, meritorious litigants may be effectively barred from
Supreme Court review or indeed from any judicial scrutiny at all.
Although the number of cases granted plenary review by the
United States Supreme Court has remained virtually the same for
many decades,38 the number of litigants seeking such review has
consistently escalated. The fact that the Court is hearing a smaller
proportion of the cases presented to it each year has several
possible explanations. One is that there were cases decided un-
necessarily in the past, or that there are now such different
conditions that a smaller percentage of cases must be decided by
a national tribunal in order to avoid conflict among the circuits. 9
Another is that, as indicated by former Chief Justice Warren,
a substantial proportion of the cases currently rejected are frivo-
lous. 40 However, there is considerable support for the conclusion
that there may be vital issues meriting attention that are not being
decided by the Supreme Court.4
At the federal district court level, more than 90% of all civil
cases are terminated before trial.42 The delay caused by the massive
workload leads to settlements in many cases as witnesses move
away or forget the events; as monetary pressures mount, the
delay gives bargaining advantages to litigants who benefit from
the lapse of time4 Moreover, such delay may affect the quality of
decisions because of the deterioration of evidence before the court.44
(1977). The statistics fail to reflect the character of the cases involved, and the qualitative
burden they impose on the courts. For example, in the Supreme Court of the United
States, there are a vastly increased number of cases involving "the most sensitive issues of
human conflict," but fewer actions involving patents, utility rates, and corporate re-
organizations-cases that typically have long and complex records. FREUND REPORT, supra
note 3, at 6.
38. See text accompanying notes 6-7 supra.
39. Co,711d'N ON REv. PRELIm. REP., supra note 32, at 14.
40. See text accompanying notes 4-5 supra.
41. See CoIMM'N ON REv. PRELIm. REP., supra note 32. The Commission on Revision
of the Federal Court Appellate System notes* that "[e]xtrapolation suggests that if we
examined all of the cases denied plenary review in a single term of the Supreme Court,
we would find, at a conservative estimate, 35 conflicts that had gone unresolved for at
least two years." Id. at 26-27.
42. Kaufman, Judicial Reform in the Next Century, 29 STAN. L. REv. 1, 1 (1976).
43. Carrington, Crowded Dockets and the Courts of Appeals: The Threat to the
Function of Review and the National Law, 82 HIARv. L. REv. 542, 544 (1969); see Kelner,
Settlement of Personal Injury Cases, 6 TRIAL L.Q. 36, 37 (1968). In 1973 the federal
courts had an overall median time interval from filing to disposition of 21 months for
certain categories of cases. [1973] AMaIsraxTvE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS,
ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 143.
44. Carrington, supra note 43.
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II. SOURCES OF INCREASED LITIGATION
Professor Grant Gilmore, in his remarkable work, The Ages
of American Law, reminds us that "[t]he importance of the role
which the courts have played in determining social and economic
policy has varied throughout our history." 4' He found that before
the Civil War, federal and state legislatures were inactive and the
courts were the predominant problem-solvers. In the post-Civil
War period, the legislatures evinced new life, and began establish-
ing administrative agencies such as the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission. During the New Deal, which evolved its own unique
regulatory program, it was widely rumored that the judiciary's
Golden Age was over.46 The post-World War II era, however, has
set that rumor to rest.
An exploration of the causes of the judiciary's expanding
workload is essential in formulating solutions for the problems
that have resulted.
A. Population Increases
Reporting on the sources of the Supreme Court's growing
caseload, the Freund Committee of the Federal Judicial Center
noted that "[t]he population of the nation will have grown from
132 million in 1940 to 210.2 million at the end of 1972." 47 Other
commentators, including former Solicitor General Bork, have
found no relation between population increases and the caseload
crisis.4 8 If has been noted that in 1960-1974 the population rose
17%, while the number of federal court cases filed rose 60%.4
Moreover, the population factor is likely to be even less
significant in the near future. Although the number of persons in
the country is still increasing, the rate of population growth has
shown a dramatic downturn in the past decade, at one point falling
below replacement level." While there has been a modest reversal
45. G. GILMORE, THE AcS OF AMERICAN LAw 15 (1977).
46. Id.
47. FREUND REPORT, supra note 3, at 3.
48. Bork, Dealing with the Overload in Article III Courts, 70 F.R.D. 231, 232-33
(1976).
49. Erlich, Legal Pollution, N.Y. Times, Feb. 8, 1976, § 6 (Magazine), at 17.
50. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, DEP'T OF COMMERCE, PUB. No. 706, ESTIATES OF THE
POPULATION OF THE UNITED STATES AND COMPONENTS OF CHANGE 1940 TO 1976, at 1 (1977).
[Vol. 28
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of this trend recently, there is no basis for a prediction that the
explosive growth rates of the 1960's will be resumed.
B. Passage of New Legislation
As the areas covered by legislation expand, new questions are
presented for judicial consideration. Environmental safety and con-
sumer rights are relatively recent examples. However, the presump-
tion that larger numbers of federal laws are being promulgated
now than in past years is, like many plausible theories, unfounded
in fact. During the 1957-58 sessions, the 85th Congress enacted
1,854 measures. In 1963-64, the 88th Congress issued 1,026. The
total in 1973-74 for the 93rd Congress was 772.1
The key factor is not the volume of new laws, but their poten-
tial for creating lawsuits. In the United States District Courts,
actions filed under new provisions of the Social Security Law in-
creased 77.1% from 1975 to 1976.52 It has been estimated that the
Mine Safety Act could generate more than 20,000 full jury trials
each year.53 The Freedom of Information Act," Consumer Credit
Protection Act,5  Fair Credit Reporting Act,56 Consumer Product
Safety Act,5 7 and Speedy Trial Act of 197458 are among the
recently promulgated federal statutes that will continue to have
a significant impact on the work of the courts.59
Undoubtedly, it is in the public interest to devise legislation
that meets widespread problems unsolvable by other means. This
does not obviate the need to consider the litigation consequences
when such legislation is drafted. Possible procedures for facilitating
this consideration will be discussed in Section III.
51. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
UNITED STATES 444 (1975). However, even if the number of laws passed does not dramati-
cally increase each year, the cumulative effect of prior laws remains.
52. [1977] ADauNIsTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT OF
nm DInCTOR 173 (Table 17). The major filings were "black lung" cases caused by pro-
longed exposure to coal dust, brought under the Black Lung Benefit Act of 1972, 30 U.S.C.
§ 901 (1976). Id. at 172.
53. REP. ON REv. FED. JuD. Sys., supra note 30, at S.
54. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976).
55. 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (1976).
56. 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (1976).
57. 15 U.S.C. § 2051 (1976).
58. 18 U.S.C. § 3161 (1976).
59. Kaufman, supra note 42, at 5 n.12.
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C. The Growth of Legal Services and of Public Awareness of
Legal Remedies
In 1965, as part of the War on Poverty, the federal government
initiated a program to provide legal services for the poor. Originally
established within the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO), the
program was nearly dismantled by the Nixon administration in
1973.00 It is now under the jurisdiction of the Legal Services
Corporation,"' which is funded through public appropriations but
composed of independent private corporations that operate as
grantees of the federal government.62 The Corporation currently
provides financial support to approximately 300 legal assistance
programs serving clients in nearly 700 offices, employing over 3,000
attorneys and 1,000 paralegals6 3 By 1971, its program attorneys had
taken more than 200 appeals to the United States Supreme Court
and had won 89.64 It had undertaken a short-term effort to provide
the equivalent of at least two lawyers for each 10,000 poor citizens
nationwide, and was funded for the fiscal year 1977 at $125 mil-
lion,65 as compared with $22 million in 1967.0
The growth of nonprofit public interest law centers, which
have concentrated on litigation of public policy questions, has
accelerated within the last ten years. The spectrum of issues ad-
dressed by these centers includes environmental and consumer
protection, land and energy use, occupational safety, tax reform,
health care, media access, employment and welfare benefits, and
corporate responsibility. 7 Ralph Nader's book, Unsafe at Any
Speed,68 other consumer-oriented reports, the work of the Sierra
Club and the Environmental Defense Fund, and the activities
of other public interest groups have all had a substantial influence
60. See Note, Legal Services-Past and Present, 59 CORN.LL L. REv. 960, 961, 965-67
(1974).
61. Legal Services Corporation Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-355, § 1001, 88 Stat. 378
(1974).
62. COUNCIL FOR PUBLIC INTEREST LAW, sup.ra note 22, at 52.
63. 2 Pov. L. RrP. (CCH) 1 8010 (May 1977).
64. COUNCIL FOR PUBLIC INTERr LAW, supra note 22, at 50. Program attorneys have
established important precedents in such areas as property law, e.g., Edwards v. Habib,
397 F.2d 687 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1016 (1969); Brown v. Southall Realty
Co., 237 A.2d 834 (D.C. Ct. App. 1968); and welfare law, Shapiro v. Thompson, 894 U.S.
618 (1969). In Shapiro the Supreme Court invalidated residency as a test for welfare
eligibility, id. at 638, a decision which resulted in payment of $140-200 million annually
to welfare recipients. Note, supra note 60, at 970 n.52 (citing 3 LAiw IN ACTION 1 (Oct.-
Nov. 1968)).
65. 2 Pov. L. RaP. 8010 (May 1977).
66. Note, supra note 60, at 968.
67. COUNCIL FOR PUBLIC INTEREsT LAW, supra note 22, at 80.
68. R. NADER, UNSAFE AT ANY SP.ED (2d ed. 1972).
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on public awareness of legal rights.6 9 Also, the National Association
for the Advancement of Colored People, the NAACP Legal De-
fense Fund, the American Civil Liberties Union, and the American
Jewish Congress, which had long been active in representing indi-
viduals challenging official action on constitutional grounds, have
been joined by new organizations established to serve other minori-
ties.70
Commentators have interpreted these developments as a sign
of "rights consciousness," which has been defined as "new demands
for participation in the political process and for sharing in the
various forms of governmentally created economic benefits ....
These [demands] have increased the resort to the courts for resolu-
tion of major public policy issues." 71
Although other observers discount rights consciousness as a
factor in the increased resort to the courts, their arguments are not
persuasive. One writer asserts that "the high rate of settlements
and the low rate of appeals in the United States suggest it should
not be regarded as having a population with great interest in secur-
ing moral victories through official vindication." 7 2 In order to
evaluate the settlement and appeal figures, however, it is necessary
to differentiate between suits involving two giant corporations,
cases brought by plaintiffs who lack the funds and the time to wait
indefinitely for a final disposition, and a myriad of other categories.
Each kind of lawsuit presents substantially different factors that
tend to increase or decrease the advantages of settlement.
The observers who discount rights consciousness cite a Detroit
study that polled citizens involved in civil disputes regarding their
goals. The study found that only a tiny minority of those questioned
(0% of landlord-tenant problems, 2% of neighborhood problems,
4%0 of overcharged purchasers problems, 9% of public organization
problems, and 31% of discrimination problems) reported that
"they sought 'justice or recognition of their rights.' "73
69. COUNCIL FOR PUBLIC INTEREST LAW, supra note 22, at 59-60, 63. The Environmental
Defense Fund (EDF) is illustrative of recently formed organizations which have expanded
public awareness of legal alternatives to environmental problems. The EDF was established
by a group of scientists who in 1967 had obtained a court ordered ban on the use of DDT
in part of New York State. Today, the EDF is funded through the National Audubon So-
ciety and annual membership dues. Id. at 63-65.
70. COUNCIL FOR PUBLIC INTERmsr LAw, supra note 22, at 30-40, 67.
71. Brickman, Of Arterial Passageways Through the Legal Process: The Right of
Universal Access to Courts and Lawyering Services, 48 N.Y.U. L. REv. 595, 596 (1973).
72. Galanter, Why the 'Haves' Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal
Change, 9 LAw & Soc'Y Rav. 95, 106 (1974).
73. Mayhew, Institutions of Representation: Civil Justice and the Public, 9 LAw &
Soc'y v. 401,413 (1975) (Table 1).
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It is true that respondents in the Detroit study did not
formulate their goals in abstract terms. They cited practical gains
to be achieved by a lawsuit; however, awareness of rights need not
include rhetoric or joining a group movement. An individual's
belief that he is not helpless in controlling his own life is also a kind
of rights consciousness.
The areas of increased caseloads are perhaps the best indication
of public awareness of legal remedies. In sheer number of cases,
commercial matters continue to represent a far larger share of the
judicial docket than civil rights questions. In 1974, 19,426 contract
cases were commenced-1 8.8% of the total filings-while 8,443 civil
rights actions were brought-representing 8.2% of the total.74 Be-
tween 1961 and 1974, however, the number of contract actions
rose by 18.9%, while the number of civil rights cases rose by a
startling 2,752.4% .75 This statistic alone clearly indicates a wide-
spread increase in citizen consciousness of civil rights.
D. Availability of Attorneys' Fees
The availability of more attorneys to carry on public interest
litigation has been accompanied by another significant develop-
ment: judicial award of attorneys' fees to plaintiffs' counsel in such
litigation. Although the Supreme Court in A lyeska Pipeline Service
Company v. Wilderness Society 6 precluded the lower federal
courts from awarding attorneys' fees in the absence of statutory
authorization, a number of federal statutes provide for these awards.
Some laws, such as the Voting Rights Act,77 the Fair Labor Stand-
ards Act, 8 the Clayton Act,79 and the Interstate Commerce Act, 80
74. [1974] ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT Or
rE DIRECTOR 205-07. These figures do not reflect the time such cases require for disposi-
tion; antitrust cases, which were only 1.2% of the total civil filings in 1974, id., may require
a substantial quantity of judicial time unless settled prior to trial. See note 11 supra.
75. [1974] ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT OF
THE DIRECTOR 205 (Table 41). The increase in such actions has been influenced by the
enactment of such legislation as the Civil Rights Act of 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-449, 74 Stat.
86 (codified in scattered sections of 18, 20, & 42 U.S.C.); the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub.
L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified in scattered sections of 28 & 42 U.S.C.); and the Equal
Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (codified in scat-
tered sections of 5 & 42 U.S.C.). For example, in fiscal year 1965 the impact of recently
enacted legislation is clear, filings having increased 58% over the prior year. Since the
Civil Rights Acts of the early 1960's, the growth in civil rights actions has been steady.
Filings rose from 3,985 in 1970 to 12,329 in 1976. [1976] ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE oF TinE
UNITED STATES COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 128-29.
76. 421 U.S. 240 (1975).
77. 42 U.S.C. § 19731 (e) (Supp. V 1975).
78. 29 U.S.C. § 216b (1976).
79. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976).
80. 49 U.S.C. § 16 (2) (1976).
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mandate a reasonable award of counsel fees to the "prevailing
party."81 Other laws, such as the Civil Rights Act of 1964,82 the
Securities Act of 1933,83 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,"4
authorize the award of such fees in the court's discretion.
The amounts awarded have occasionally been $375,000 or
more in a single suit.8 5 These fee awards are a factor in the increase
of litigation because they may in turn finance the commencement
of new lawsuits by counsel engaged in public interest litigation.
E. Judicial Expansion of Constitutional Rights
Some of the myriad areas in which the courts have interpreted
legislation and reshaped constitutional doctrines were discussed
above. The judiciary has intervened in the day-to-day operation of
hospitals, prisons, and at least in one instance a school district.8
During the sixteen terms that Chief Justice Warren presided over
the United States Supreme Court, it expressly overruled its prior
decisions on thirty-one occasions; there had been only twenty-seven
such express changes in doctrine in the previous 163 years.8 7 This
does not take into account the importance or vintage of the de-
cisions overruled, nor possible sub silentio reversals in position in
prior terms. Nevertheless, it indicates the Court's view of its re-
sponsibilities prior to the appointment of Chief Justice Warren
81. See, e.g., Agricultural Fair Practice Act of 1967, 7 U.S.C. § 2305 (1976); Packers
and Stockyard Act, 7 U.S.C. § 210 (f) (1976); Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act,
7 U.S.C. § 449g (b) (1976). The "prevailing party" requirement itself may be productive
of litigation. If plaintiff wins in the District and Circuit Courts, but the Supreme Court
denies certiorari on the grounds of mootness, has the plaintiff "prevailed"?
82. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000 (a)-3 (b), e-5 (k) (1976).
83. 15 U.S.C. § 77k (e) (1976).
84. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78i (e), r (a) (1976).
85. See, e.g., Beazer v. New York City Transit Auth., 558 F.2d 97, 100 (2d Cir. 1977);
City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d 448 (2d Cir. 1974). In Grinnell the court re-
versed an initial fee award of $1.5 million. On remand, the District Court awarded $870,607.
On subsequent appeal, the Second Circuit held that appellee should receive a total fee
of $333,073.25. City of Detroit v. Grinnell, 560 F.2d 1093, 1103 (2d Cir. 1977)., See also
Serrano v. Priest, 20 Cal. 3d 25, 569 P.2d 1303, 141 Cal. Rptr. 315 (1977) (permitting an
$800,000 attorney's fee award).
86. N.Y. Times, April 24, 1977, § 1 at 1, col. 2. Professor Burt Neuborne's analysis in
Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HAxv. L. REV. 1105, 1106 (1977), differentiates between
federal and state judges with respect to their receptivity to constitutional litigation. Citing
both historical and institutional factors, he notes that lawyers seeking "expansive definition
and vigorous application of federal constitutional rights" have turned to the federal
judiciary while their opponents have sought to channel such challenges into the state
courts. Id.
87. Holland, American Liberals and Judicial Activism: Alexander Bickel's Appeal
from the New to the Old, 51 IND. L.J. 1025, 1027 n.8 (1976).
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Burger.88 Commentators have noted that the increased caseload
of the federal courts is attributable in part to such changes in
constitutional analysis.89
The work of the courts is affected by these shifts in constitu-
tional interpretation in two ways: directly, by creation of new
substantive and procedural rights that can be the basis for com-
mencement of lawsuits, and indirectly, by enhancement of the
public perception of the courts as the "most responsive and effective
agencies of change during the past generation," 00 which in turn
may stimulate litigation.
The direct impact needs no underlining. The indirect effect
relates to the structure and performance of the other branches of
government. Professor Cox has observed that because of the size
and diversified functions of the legislature and the executive,
judicial intervention often becomes the only available source of
relief. He notes further that "modem government is simply too
large and too remote, and too few issues are fought out in elections,
for a citizen to feel much more sense of participation in the
legislative process than the judicial.""' The courts act as a smaller
unit in which the power of individuals to effect change can be
clearly understood, and offer the accessibility that bureaucracies
and legislatures appear to lack.
F. Sociological Factors
Law is a social phenomenon. Increasing resort to the law
reflects changes in social trends and institutions, which can to some
degree be isolated and quantified 2
88. See id. The Supreme Court under Chief Justice Burger has also reinterpreted
rights in several areas. For example, in National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833
(1976), the Court invalidated a provision of the Fair Labor Standards Act, thus limiting
the reach of the commerce clause. The Court has modified the application of the equal
protection clause, see, e.g., Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974); the due process clause,
see, e.g., Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976), Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976);
and specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights, see, e.g., Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507
(1976) (first amendment); Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual
Rights, 90 HARv. L. REv. 489, 495-98 (1977); Neuborne, The Procedural Assault on the
Warren Legacy: A Study in Repeal by Indirection, 5 HorsTRA L. REV. 545 (1977).
89. See, e.g., FREUND REPORT, supra note 3, at 2. The ratio of cases decided by the
Supreme Court shifted to approximately two-to-one in favor of civil liberties over economic
issues during the last half-dozen terms of the Warren Court. Between World War II and
the 1962 term, and since the beginning of the Burger Court, the Supreme Court has de-
cided on the merits an equal number of cases raising economic issues as those raising
social or political issues. G. SCHUBERT, JUDICIAL POICY MAKING 178 (rev. ed. 1974).
90. Rosenberg, supra note 14, at 810.
91. A. Cox, supra note 16, at 116.
92. For an illuminating and provocative discussion of this subject, see D. BLACK, THE
BEHAVIOR OF LAw (1976).
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Law varies inversely with other forms of social control: there
is more "law"-including litigation, legislation, and regulation-
when other modes of social control diminishY3 As a long term trend
the role of law has increased as the kinship group, the dose-knit
community and the religious nucleus have shown signs of dissolu-
tionY4 Studies of cultures in such diverse areas as Mexico, Taiwan,
Ethiopia, Israel and Wales, as well as modern American society,
illustrate this correlation.95 In addition, a relationship can be found
between law and cultural distance. Litigation is less likely at the
extremes, where there is little or no cultural diversity, or where
such diversity is so enormous that there is no contact at all between
the various societal segments.9 6 In Chinese-American communities,
disputes between Chinese and non-Chinese are more likely to end
in litigation than controversies between fellow Chinese;97 the same
is true in Italian neighborhoods. 9 However, as the homogeneity
of such neighborhood enclaves disappear and elements of a common
culture pervade our various subcultures, litigation increases. 99
The function of this analysis is to note the changes in social
pattern that relate to the increase in lawsuits, not to posit conclu-
sions about the value or lack of value in such changes. For example,
93. See id. at 6-7, 106-10.
94. Black, Mobilization of Law, 2 J. OF LEGAL STUD. 125, 147 (1973).
95. See D. BLAcK, supra note 92, 6-7, 106-10; Gallin, Conflict Resolution in Changing
Chinese Society: A Taiwanese Study, in PoLITICAL ANTHROPOLOGY 265-74 (M. Swartz, V.
Turner & A. Tuden eds. 1966); Lowenstein, Ethiopia, in AF-ICAN PENAL SYsTEM 35, 49
(A. Milner ed. 1969); Nader & Metzger, Conflict Resolution in Two Mexican Communities,
65 AM. ANTHROPOLOGiST 584, 589-91 (1963); Peters, Aspects of the Social Control of Moral
Ambiguities: A Comparative Analysis of Two Culturally Disparate Modes of Social Con-
trol, in Tim ALLOCATION OF REsPONSIiLrry 109-62 (M. Gluckman ed. 1972); Schwartz,
Social Factors in the Development of Legal Control: A Case Study of Two Israeli Settle-
ments, 63 YALE LJ. 471 (1954). There also appears to be a direct correlation between the
degree of organization in a society-including not only the development of governmental
bureaucracies but also the growth of private groups and corporations-and the incidence
of litigation. D. BLACK, supra note 92, at 91. Organizations and groups initiate more law-
suits than individuals, although many of these may be debt collections, and the more
organized the body the more this holds true; corporations bring more litigation than
voluntary organizations. A group is more likely to bring a lawsuit against an individual
than vice versa, and is more likely to win. Galanter, Afterword: Explaining Litigation,
9 LAw & Soc'Y REv. 347, 348-60 (1975); Wanner, The Public Ordering of Private Relations.
Part Two: Winning Civil Court Cases, 9 LAw & Soc'Y REv. 293, 300 (1975) (Table V). In
three large cities in the United States half of the plaintiffs in civil litigation are organiza-
tions, but two-thirds of the defendants are individuals. Wanner, The Public Ordering of
Private Relations. Part One: Initiating Civil Cases in Urban Trial Courts, 8 LAw & Soc'Y
REv. 421,423-38 (1974).
96. D. BLACK, supra note 92, at 74-80.
97. See Grace, Justice, Chinese Style, 75 CASE & Co-m. 50, 51 (Jan.-Feb. 1970).
98. G. SUT-LEs, THE SociAL ORDER OF THE SLUNI: ETHNICITY AND TERRITORY IN THE
INNER CITY 101-02 (1968).
99. See D. BLACK, supra note 92, at 76-78.
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in certain agrarian societies where sons own little or nothing until
the death of the father, the authority of the father is greater than in
a modern society where sons become independent at an earlier
age.10° The older pattern may be viewed as desirable because it
promoted stability and certainty, or undesirable because it per-
mitted tyranny. The lack of consensus in values is in itself a reflec-
tion of the decrease of social control other than law. A judicial
solution needs no agreement; it presumes an adversarial context,
and the policeman is waiting in the wings if enforcement is
required.
The causes of increased litigation thus include sociological
factors such as the decline in traditional modes of social control and
the growth of rights consciousness, legislative and judicial expan-
sion of access to the courts, and economic incentives such as the
award of attorneys' fees.
III. FUTURE TRENDS AND POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
A. The Provision of Legal Services to the Public
and Its Relation to Caseload Increases
The state of the judicial docket is related in part to the capacity
and programs of the organizations providing legal representation to
lower and middle income groups. With the expansion of such pro-
grams, a further increase in litigation is foreseeable.
Public interest law groups,10 1 serving environmentalists, con-
sumers, racial and ethnic minorities, and the poor, received contri-
butions estimated at $130.4 million in the period from 1972 to
197502 However, continued funding for public law centers may be
in jeopardy. Foundations are gradually withdrawing from financing
older groups, and have not manifested substantial interest in fund-
ing new organizations. 03
The prognosis for prepaid group legal services, to which mem-
bers or subscribers pay a fixed fee and may subsequently request
100. Id. at 32.
101. The definition of what constitutes a public interest law group is set forth in
COUNCIL FOR PU13LC INmTEsr LAW, supra note 22, at 6-7.
102. Id. at 90.
103. Id. at 23840; see Lenny, The Case for Funding Citizen Participation in the Ad.
ministrative Process, 28 AD. L. RaV. 483, 485 (1976). However, the funding of public inter-
est centers has increased overall, from $25.8 million in 1972 to $40.1 million in 1975.
Rogovin, Public Interest Law: The Next Horizon, 63 A.B.A.J. 334, 338 (1977).
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contractually specified legal assistance, is more expansive. In Cali-
fornia there are at least 350 such plans, based on a "closed" panel
of attorneys from which beneficiaries must choose. There are an
estimated 2,000 to 8,000 programs throughout the country.1°4
"Open" plans are also in operation, such as the Maryland Credit
Union League Legal Services Plan. The Maryland plan, launched
in 1973, is available to 600,000 members who are charged thirty
dollars semi-annually. Members may select any licensed attorney,
with cash allowances towards the cost of such counsel. 105 More than
1,000,000 persons already belong to some form of group or prepaid
program.108
The judicial framework for the development of prepaid plans
was created in a series of Supreme Court decisions beginning with
NAACP v. Button, 1 T which applied first amendment protection to
the use of litigation as a means of group advocacy. In its most
recent decision on the subject, United Transportation Union v.
State Bar of Michigan,08 the Court applied this principle to a
union program designed to assist workers in filing damage suits
under the Federal Employers Liability Act." 9 The union had
secured agreements from all counsel that charges would not exceed
twenty-five percent of the recovery including all expenses, which
protected the members from excessive legal fees." 0
Federal legislation has also implemented the expansion of pre-
paid plans. The Labor Management Relations Act was recently
amended to permit employers to contribute to a jointly adminis-
104. Hatt, Legal Insurance in the United States, 1973-1974 ANN. SURVEY Am. L. 213,
215 (1974).
105. Dunne, Prepaid Legal Services Have Arrived, 4 HoFsrRA L. REv. 1, 40 (1975). A
plan sponsored by the Shreveport Bar Association of Louisiana was the first "open" plan
and the first program to be sponsored by a bar association. Begun in 1971, the program
provides limited coverage for 600 union members and their dependents. Twenty percent
of the eligible members now annually use the services of the plan. Id. at 14-15.
106. COUNCIL FOR PUBLIC INTERESr LAW, supra note 22, at 325.
107. 371 U.S. 415 (1963). The decision distinguished such group advocacy from
barratry, which is the encouragement of litigation solely in order to create a profit for an
attorney. This activity is prohibited under common law. Id. at 439-43.
108. 401 U.S. 576 (1971).
109. 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1970).
110. 401 U.S. at 577-78. Prior to the United Transpprtation Union decision, the Su-
preme Court extended protection to group legal plans by sanctioning the hiring of staff
attorneys by a union to represent its members. U.M.W. District 12 v. Ill. State Bar Ass'n,
389 U.S. 217 (1967). In Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Va. State Bar, 377 U.S. 1 (1964),
the Court ruled that a state court injunction against a union's practice of recommending
specific lawyers to represent its members in railroad personal injury litigation denied the
members rights guaranteed by the first and fourteenth amendments. Id. at 8.
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tered trust fund to "defray the costs of legal services." 11' The funds
contributed cannot be used to sue a union or an employer.12 The
Employees Retirement Income Security Program18  establishes
standards for employee benefit plans, including prepaid legal
services, and requires reporting and disclosure of specified data,
such as source of financing, eligibility and participation require-
ments, and circumstances that may result in disqualification.
State law, by contrast, is far from uniform, with court interpre-
tations and statutory provisions in many jurisdictions restricting
implementation of prepaid legal plans."4 Twenty-three state insur-
ance departments have issued no formal opinions on whether pre-
paid plans constitute insurance. Five state insurance departments
have held that insurance provisions apply, seven held the contrary,
and six provide for partial regulation." 5
It seems probable, however, that public demand will facilitate
rapid growth of such systems to deliver legal services. In 1975, the
Staff Director of the American Bar Association's Special Committee
on Prepaid Legal Services predicted that twenty-five percent of the
American public will use this approach within the next five years. 10
111. 29 U.S.C. § 186 (c) (8) (1976), as amended by Act of August 15, 1973, Pub. L.
No. 93-95, 87 Stat. 314.
112. Id. (second proviso).
113. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1381 (1976); see, e.g., 29 U.S.C. §§ 1002 (1), 1021 (a) (1), 1022
(a) (1), 1023, 1024 (1976).
114. Gasperini, Prepaid Legal Services: The Long View, 61 A.B.A.J. 1348, 1348 (1975).
115. Dunne, supra note 105, at 35-36. Whether prepaid legal insurance is within the
ambit of the insurance laws of New York, the insurance center of the country, is critical
since New York law defines what types of insurance may be sold. Id. at 36 (citing N.Y.
INs. LAw § 46 (McKinney 1966)). In a recent New York case, Feldstein v. Attorney Gen-
eral, 36 N.Y.2d 199, 326 N.E.2d 288, 366 N.Y.S.2d 613 (1975), the court concluded that two
particular prepaid plans did not involve "insurance" within the meaning of state law.
The case did not decide whether future plans would be subject to insurance department
regulation. Another problem which prepaid legal plans may face is the extent to which
the federal antitrust laws apply to such plans and restrict the use of certain payment
schemes. It is arguable that a list of proscribed fees followed by a number of plan at-
torneys who are otherwise independent constitutes price-fixing. See Decker, The Federal
Finger of the Antitrust Division, in A.BA., NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON PREPAID LEGAL
SERVICES: TRANscsusr Or PROCEEDINGS 123 (1974); Dunne, supra note 105, at 33-35.
116. Gasperini, supra note 114, at 1351. The American Bar Association's survey of
the public, based on a sample of 2,064, showed that 6.2% of the respondents would join
a prepayment plan costing as much as $12.00 per month, and 23.6% would be interested
in a program charging $3.00 per month. B. CURAN & F. SPALDING, THE LEGAL NEEDS or
THE PUBLIC 91 (1974). However, participants at a New York State Bar Association meeting
on Bar-sponsored legal services plans indicated that the public has shown little interest
in such programs. "(People) sometimes think that the hook-up with a bar association is
just another case of lawyers pushing themselves and their business on the public," one
speaker explained. 179 N.Y.L.J., Jan. 20, 1978, at 4, col. 6. Attorneys surveyed by associa-
tions in the states of Washington and California indicated "overwhelming. .. approval
of bar association sponsorship of state-wide programs of open panel legal insurance. .. "
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The National Science Foundation has estimated that prepaid pro-
grams will employ between twenty and thirty thousand lawyers
by 1985.117
Because of the advantages accruing to participants, the trend
to increased public reliance on prepaid legal services is unlikely to
be reversed, despite its potential effect on judicial administration.
Indeed, any arbitrary limitation on publicly or privately sponsored
legal service groups would be far too draconian, and would deprive
some individuals of legal protection on grounds unrelated to the
merits of their cases.
B. Judicial Limitations on Standing or Legal Grounds to Sue
The judiciary has established a variety of obstacles to its own
portals. In recent years, the Supreme Court has effectively limited
or foreclosed court access to a number of litigants on the ground
that they lacked standing. The overloaded state of the docket is
one important factor inclining the courts towards strict standing
doctrines.118
For example, in a challenge to a town zoning ordinance that
had allegedly prevented low and moderate income persons from
living in the locality, plaintiffs included individuals living in
adjacent areas, who claimed that they could not find adequate
housing in the town, taxpayers of a nearby city, who alleged that
the town's exclusionary zoning compelled more low income people
to live in the city and increased the city's tax burden, and a home
builders' association, which claimed that the zoning ordinance pre-
vented its members from building low or moderate-income housing
Hatt, supra note 104, at 215. It should be noted that the Federal Trade Commission has
launched a nationwide investigation of alleged restrictions imposed by bar associations on
innovative methods of delivering legal services. 178 N.Y.L.J., Dec. 28, 1977, at 1, col. 2.
117. COUNCIL FOR PUBLIC INTEREsT LAW, supra note 22, at 825-26.
118. D. CURRIE, FEDERAL JURISDICTION IN A NUTsHELL 12 (1976). In Moore v. City of
East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977), involving the analogous area of exhaustion of admin-
istrative remedies, Justice Burger stated pointedly in dissent:
This Court has not yet required one in appellant's position to utilize available
state administrative remedies as a prerequisite to obtaining federal relief; but ex-
perience has demonstrated that such a requirement is imperative if the critical
overburdening of federal courts at all levels is to be alleviated. That burden has
now become "a crisis of overload, a crisis so serious that it threatens the capacity
of the federal system to function as it should." . . .The devastating impact over-
crowded dockets have on the quality of justice received by all litigants makes it
essential that courts be reserved for the resolution of disputes for which no other




there."" The Court rejected the challenge, holding that none of the
plaintiffs could demonstrate that nullification of the ordinance
would directly ameliorate their injury.120
The Supreme Court has also held that low income persons and
welfare rights organizations have no standing to attack the tax-
exempt status of hospitals that limit treatment of indigent patients
to emergency room services only.' 2'
In another case a taxpayer was precluded from challenging the
secrecy of the Central Intelligence Agency budget as violative of
the constitutional requirement 122 that "a regular Statement and
Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money shall
be published from time to time." 123 Plaintiff was found to have
suffered no actionable injury as a consequence of the budget
secrecy.'2 The Court commented that the federal judiciary could
not be used as a "forum in which to air ... generalized grievances
about the conduct of government or the allocation of power within
the Federal System.""12
Such standing doctrines have been denounced as veiled attacks
on substantive rights and remedies granted by the United States
Constitution and by statute. 26 Moreover, these doctrines, although
recently expanded, are not novel; they have not yet stemmed the
rising caseload, and thus cannot be looked to as the sole solution
to the judicial dilemma.
C. Enlargement of Court Resources
Since the factors that channel disputes into a judicial forum
continue unabated, the appointment of more judges is an obvious
response. This solution is, however, not a panacea. The costs in-
volved are high. In the federal courts $250,000 may be necessary
to make a single judgeship operational, and $200,000 per year may
119. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
120. Id. at 503-07.
121. Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26 (1976).
122. U.S. CONsr. art. I, § 9, cd. 7.
123. United States v. Richardson, 418 US. 166, 168 (1974); cf. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S.
83 (1968) (to establish standing in a taxpayer's suit challenging the constitutionality of a
federal spending program, taxpayers must demonstrate a logical connection between their
status and the type of legislation attacked, and must establish a nexus between that status
and the nature of the constitutional infringement alleged).
124. 418 U.S. at 176-78.
125. 418 U.S. at 174 (quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 114 (1968) (Stewart, J., con-
curring)); cf. Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923) (a taxpayer does not have stand.
ing to restrain the enforcement of a congressional act authorizing appropriations).
126. Hager, supra note 37, at 1231-32.
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be incurred for continuing expenses. 127 Further, the addition of
judges does not guarantee a proportional increase in the disposition
rate of pending matters. The number of federal judgeships rose
twenty-five percent between 1959 and 1961, while disposition of
cases increased only three percent. 28 These percentages also dem-
onstrate that the implications of the case overload problem reach
far beyond one-dimensional solutions, such as the addition of
personnel.
Indefinite expansion of the judiciary would, moreover, erode
collegiality, which has been termed "an essential element in the
collective evolution of sound legal principles." 29 The number of
conflicting decisions, resulting from failure to exchange information
and views, would increase. Ironically, the confusion caused by such
conflicts produces still more litigation. 30 Lack of opportunity for
discussion among judges also increases the possibility that personal
animosity will be injected into differences of opinion on the issues.
Such animosity has been found to affect the quality of judicial
performance. 13'
These are arguments against open-ended enlargement of the
size of the judiciary, not against additional appointments of well-
qualified candidates. However, these considerations demand the
development of alternative approaches that would restructure the
role of the judiciary.
D. Diversion of Disputes
1. The existing approaches. Resolution of controversies out-
side the formal court system is conducted in a variety of settings by
127. Clark, Parajudges and the Administration of Justice, 24 VAND. L. REv. 1167, 1172
(1972).
128. Note, Ross v. Bernhard: The Uncertain Future of the Seventh Amendment, 81
YAL LJ. 112, 125 n.74 (1971).
129. REP. oN REv. F.D. JuD. Sys., supra note 30, at 6.
130. Id. at 7. It also has been suggested that more circuit courts be added to the
federal system. Again, this alternative would increase the possibility of intercircuit conflicts
and thus additional litigation, as well as public confusion over applicable legal require-
ments. For an exposition of the arguments pro and con, see, e.g., Carrington, Crowded
Dockets and the Courts of Appeals: The Threat to the Function of Review and the Na-
tional Law, 82 HAv. L. REv. 542, 586-87 (1969); Commission Recommends Splitting Fifth
and Ninth Circuits to Create Two New Federal Appellate Circuits, 60 A.Ba.J. 209 (1974);
Currie & Goodman, supra note 38, at 25 n.86; Hellman, Legal Problems of Dividing a
State Between Federal Judicial Circuits, 122 U. PA. L. Rv. 1188 (1974).
131. See H. FRImNDLY, supra note 34, at 46. Considerations of collegiality and the
possibility of conflicting decisions are of course irrelevant to the hiring of more support
and administrative personnel for the courts. The efficiency of the judiciary depends in
part on the availability of sufficient support staff.
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religious tribunals, neighborhood agencies, mediators and arbi-
trators. The Rabbinical Court of Justice of the Associated Syna-
gogues of Massachusetts provides this type of alternative.1 2 Another
example is an innovative neighborhood mediation center in Har-
lem, under the auspices of the Institute for Mediation and Conflict
Resolution, which receives referrals of matters such as domestic
disputes and harassment complaints. 3 The mediators are local
residents who have undergone four months of training. The advan-
tages offered to those availing themselves of the program are that no
court record is compiled, and the ultimate judgment is that of the
local community.134
Another approach to diversion is a requirement that disputes
be arbitrated before they are eligible for judicial scrutiny, preserv-
ing the right to proceed in court if either side is dissatisfied with
the arbitration award. Such a requirement has been suggested by a
Justice Department study for money damage suits of $50,000 or
less filed in the federal district courts.3 t Compulsory arbitration
for small claims is used in Pennsylvania, where each county is
authorized by court rule to establish arbitration panels composed of
three lawyers. Every award entered has the effect of a court
judgment. 36 During the first twenty-two months of the program,
the municipal courts were spared between 2,500 and 4,000 trials of
small cases.'37
132. Leigh-Wai Doo, Dispute Settlement in Chinese-American Communities, 21 Ass.
J. ComP. L. 627, 627 n.1 (1973).
133. The Institute is located in New York City, at 49 E. 68th Street, and is manned
by a staff of six to seven persons.
134. N.Y. Times, May 28, 1975, § 1, at 45, col. 8; see Danzig & Lowy, Everyday Dis.
putes and Mediation in the United States: A Reply to Professor Felstiner, 9 LAw & Soc'v
REv. 675, 686-87 n.9 (1975); Felstiner, Influences of Social Organization on Dispute
Processing, 9 LAsw & Soc'y Rxv. 63, 87-88 (1974).
135. N.Y. Times, Dec. 11, 1977, § 1, at 51, col. 1. Disputes would be referred to a
panel of three arbitrators. Federal judges in Connecticut and the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania have tentatively agreed to test the plan. Id. The New York County Lawyer's
Association has criticized similar pending legislation, H.R. Rep. No. 9778, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1977), for establishing minimal qualifications and pay for arbitrators and for requiring
mandatory rather than voluntary arbitration. COMMITrEE ON FEDERAL LEGISLATION, NEw
YORK COUNTY LAWYER'S ASSOCIATION, REPORT ON PROPOSED LEGISLATION TO ENCOURAGE
ARBITRATION OF CIVIL CAsa IN UNITED STATES Disn ar COURTS 1, 2 (1977). The Association
has also argued, inter alia, that a provision of the bill that provides parties with a right
to a trial de novo would defeat the advantage of expedition sought by the legislation. Id.
at 3.
136. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, §§ 30, 51 (Purdon 1963). The statute provides for appeal
to courts of general jurisdiction. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 71 (Purdon 1963).
137. Rosenberg 8c Schubin, Trial by Lawyer: Compulsory Arbitration of Small Claims
in Pennsylvania, 74 HARv. L. REv. 448, 462 (1961) (reporting the results of an empirical
study conducted by the Columbia University Project for Effective Justice). However, all
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Assistance in resolving labor disputes is available from the
Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service. The industries that
have used the Service range from copper mining to clothing, the
sole criterion being whether the dispute threatens to cause sub-
stantial interruption of interstate commerce.18 8 Voluntary arbitra-
tion is provided by the American Arbitration Association and other
groups for both labor and commercial controversies. 139
Settlement of civil disputes depends on the parties' coopera-
tion or their initial agreement to negotiate the dispute. This may
not always be forthcoming. Nonetheless, it can safely be predicted
that systems of nonjudicial dispute resolution will continue to
expand. The Justice Department's formal agenda, released in May
1977, lists the creation of Neighborhood Justice Centers as an
additional initiative. 40
While the informal approaches that have evolved are novel
and can absorb some of the controversies that might otherwise have
been channelled to the judiciary, a substantial number of disputes
terminable only by compulsory process will remain. As we have
seen, even mandatory arbitration is often only a screening device,
since the judiciary again becomes the ultimate resort if either party
refuses to accept the award.
2. A suggested remedy. There is an exit from this hall of
mirrors. A significant inroad could be made on the caseload by the
creation of new administrative tribunals of general jurisdiction that
would address the repetitious factual issues inherent in the litiga-
leading studies of the Pennsylvania procedure have noted that it has inherent limitations
that could preclude its usefulness for larger cases. Comment, Arbitration and Award, 113
U. PA. L. REV. 1117, 1119 (1965). For a summary and analysis of other small claims courts
and arbitration procedures, see E. JOHNSON, V. KANTOR & E. ScmnvARTz, OUTSmE THE
CouRrs: A SURVEY OF DIVERSION ALTERNATIVES IN CIvIL CASES 89-56 (1977) [hereinafter cited
as SURVEY OF DIVERSION ALTERNATIVES].
138. 29 U.S.C. §§ 171-178 (1976). In fiscal year 1974, the Service was involved in re-
solving 18,809 dispute cases, 8,479 of which involved a joint meeting between the parties.
27 FED. MED. & CON. SERV. ANN. REP. 27 (1974).
189. See, e.g., S. LAZARUS, RESOLVING BUSINESS DISPUTES 23-24 (1965); Mentschikoff,
Commercial Arbitration, in M. BERNSTEIN, PRIVATE DIsPUTE SEITLEMENT 8-14 (1968). Other
channels of dispute settlement include public and private ombudsmen, CoMMISSION ON A
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, A.B.A., QUEST FOR JUSTICE 40 (1975), and compulsory arbi-
tration, W. GERSHENFELD, H. GLASBEEx, B. HEPPLE, J. LOWENBERG & K. WALKER, CoarPuL-
SORy ARBITRATION (1976). See generally SURVEY OF DIVERSION ALTERNATIVES, supra note 187.
140. Hager, supra note 37, at 1284. The Law Enforcement Assistance Administration
(LEAA) of the Department of Justice is setting up three experimental Neighborhood Jus-
tice Centers in Atlanta, Kansas City, and Los Angeles, each funded at about $200,000 for
eighteen months. A minimal full-time staff will supervise part-time mediators recruited
from the community. The LEAA will spend more money to evaluate the results of the
three Neighborhood Justice Centers than it will to run them, in the hope that standards
can be developed for use by others. 64 A.B.A.J. 29 (1978).
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tion of claims under a pool of specified regulatory and social
services legislation. Such legislation governs our environment, our
energy needs, our safety and health. Concerns such as these need
particular attention, and if they are thrust on overworked federal
and state courts in competition with the criminal and civil matters
already being litigated there, they will not receive it. The large
expected annual increase in jury trials, which is anticipated in the
federal district courts as a result of the Mine Safety Act, is only
one example. 141
As a Department of Justice study has pointed out: "Although
[federal] . . .courts are uniquely qualified to protect individual
processes of government.., they are not unique in their ability
to adjudicate relatively unsophisticated, repetitious factual issues.
Many other kinds of tribunals perform that function as accurately
and well." 142
The advantages of the administrative tribunals are threefold:
a) Unlike existing administrative agencies,143 they would not
be confined to one specialized subject matter. This jurisdiction
would facilitate a high degree of flexibility. If there were a decline
in litigation in some fields, the administrative law judges could
turn their attention to other peak areas. Unlike the courts, the
agencies could handle some cases without counsel and without
formal procedures, while others could be structured with formal
evidentiary requirements, depending on the technical nature of
the issues and the needs of the parties. 144 And, unlike arbitration,
which involves many different models developed ad hoc and may
lead to de novo review by a trial level court, the administrative
tribunals would be created by statute and their decisions would be
141. See text accompanying note 53 supra.
142. REP. ON REV. FED. Jun. Sys., supra note 30, at 8 (urging establishment of new
federal administrative tribunals).
143. The United States Government has at least 60 agencies, and many more quasi-
official agencies, boards and panels. 1977/78 UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT MANUAL 456-95.
"Agencies have long exercised adjudicatory authority analytically similar to that exercised
by courts." B. ScmvARTz, ADMINISrRAatVE L.w § 4 (1976). There are at least 800 adminis-
trative law judges serving with 22 federal agencies. Miller, Annual Report of the Section
of Administrative Law (1972-1973), 25 AD. L. REv. 369, 371 (1973). The typical method of
review of agency determinations is by courts of appeals. B. ScH'ARTz, supra at § 144.
Some administrative decisions, such as cases decided under the Social Security Act, 42
U.S.C. § 405 (g) (1976), are reviewed by single district court judges. Id. For an incisive
analysis of the alternative methods of judicial review of federal administrative action, see
Currie & Goodman, supra note 33.
144. R P. ON REV. FED. Jun. Sys., supra note 30, at 9-10. The Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Rev. Comm'n, 430 U.S. 442
(1977), indicates that Congress has considerable latitude in fashioning administrative pro-
ceedings to implement rights created solely by statute.
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appealed directly to the federal or state appellate courts that pres-
ently review agency action.
These tribunals would handle cases involving carefully defined
and recurring factual questions. If either party in a suit claimed
that substantial constitutional issues were presented, and this claim
were sustained in a review-perhaps by a committee composed of
representatives of the administrative tribunal and of the court that
would ordinarily hear the matter-the case could be transferred to
the appropriate court for determination.
b) Hearing officers would develop a high degree of pro-
ficiency in administrative law questions, but would still retain a
broad outlook on the competing values and considerations relevant
to their decisions. The varied caseloads would also be an induce-
ment in recruiting candidates of high quality.
c) The courts, which have a more inflexible structure and
more formal procedural requirements, would be left with a sub-
stantially smaller workload. It has been estimated, for example,
that 20,000 to 30,000 cases per year, resulting from federal legisla-
tive programs, could be handled by administrative tribunals in-
stead of by federal courts. 45
E. Creation of More Specialized Courts
Specialized federal courts include the Court of Claims, which
has exclusive jurisdiction in disputes involving claims of $ 10,000 or
more and certain other claims against the United States;140 the Tax
Court, which has nonexclusive jurisdiction to determine challenges
to tax assessments;147 and the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals,
which hears appeals from certain decisions of the Board of Appeals
and the Board of Interference Examiners of the Patent and Trade-
mark Office.148 It has been suggested that special environmental
courts be established, because environmental litigation involves
145. Id. These tribunals would also handle commercial disputes that arise from
federal legislation and involve repetitious factual issues.
146. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1491-1506 (1976); see 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (a) (2) (1976).
147. 26 U.S.C. §§ 6213 (a), 7442 (1976). The payment of the tax is not a prerequisite
to commencing such a proceeding. See, e.g., Granquist v. Hackleman, 264 F.2d 9, 14-15
(9th Cir. 1959). Tax court decisions are reviewable by the United States courts of appeals.
26 U.S.C. § 7482 (a) (1976).
148. 28 U.S.C. § 1542 (1976). The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals also has
jurisdiction to review certain decisions of the United States Customs Courts, the Commis.
sioner of Patents, and the United States Tariff Commission. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1541-1543 (1976).
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technical expertise "of at least comparable magnitude and com-
plexity as that required in tax litigation." 141
Arguments for the maintenance of such courts, particularly
the tax courts, include the advantage of judges with greater ex-
posure to technical issues. This advantage creates less inconsistency
in resolving common problems, greater speed in dispositions, and
a decreased burden on nonspecialized courts. 50
Those who oppose the creation of additional specialized courts
in new areas have pointed to two kinds of problems. There is a
danger of polarization of judicial appointments around a single
set of issues.' 5' Moreover, there may be a loss of the perspective
and concomitant thoroughness of analysis that is presently facili-
tated by the broad range of filings.5 2 The jurisdiction of the
specialized court may itself be the subject of new litigation.5 3
Additional and persuasive criticisms can be made regarding an
environmental court. Environmental problems cut across a number
of areas in the law, such as products liability, employment rights,
and land use regulation. The difficulty of defining the perimeters
of the court's jurisdiction would therefore be particularly acute.
Moreover, judges located in a centralized environmental court
would have less direct knowledge of local situations and settings.
Agencies that have been involved in environmental litigation have
reported that courts of general jurisdiction have in fact adequately
handled the scientific issues that have arisen. 5 4
While the establishment of additional tribunals is essential
to resolution of the caseload crisis, such tribunals should-as urged
above-be administrative rather than judicial, and should have
competence to determine a broad range of commercial, consumer,
health, social security and other controversies.
149. Whitney, The Case for Creating a Special Environment Court System, 14 Wr.
& MARY L. REV. 473, 482 (1973). Whitney's proposal that environmental courts be estab-
lished, see Note, The Environmental Court Proposal: Requiem, Analysis, and Counter.
proposal, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 676, 692 (1975), suggests that special masters should play
an expanded role in evaluating the scientific material in environmental litigation,
150. FREUND REPORT, supra note 3, at 11; Whitney, supra note 149, at 476; see Currie
& Goodman, supra note 33, at 63; Friendly, supra note 4, at 639.
151. FREUND REPORT, supra note 3, at 11.
152. Id.
153. See Currie & Goodman, supra note 33, at 73.
154. REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT, ACTING THROUGH THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, ON THE
FEASIBILITY OF ESTABLISHING AN ENVIRONMENTAL COURT SYsrEm ch. VI, at 15-16 (1973). Agen-
cies such as the Atomic Energy Commission and the Environmental Protection Agency sup.
ported this view in response to an inquiry circulated by the Attorney General. Id.
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F. Legislative Amendments to Federal Jurisdiction
An extremely effective approach, which requires no new courts
for its implementation, is the elimination of federal diversity
jurisdiction. Diversity cases are brought in the federal courts when
the litigants are citizens of different states; however, federal courts
must apply state substantive law in deciding these controversies.
More than 30,000 diversity cases-one-fifth of the total filings-were
brought in the federal district courts during the 1975 fiscal year,
and they accounted for sixty-eight percent of all civil jury trials.
Appeals from diversity actions constituted more than ten percent of
the courts of appeals' caseload. 155
Although diversity jurisdiction can be invoked by local resi-
dents, its origin is principally found in the widespread feeling that
state courts or legislatures might be biased against nonresidents. 56
Yet, greater mobility and communication between localities have
lessened this possible bias. Moreover, federal judges have no special
competence in interpreting state law issues, especially when the
point in question has not yet been definitively determined by the
state courts. Because of the multiplicity of state forums available
to absorb the cases, curtailment of diversity jurisdiction would
increase the civil business of state courts of general jurisdiction by
only 0.27 to 1.50. 151
Additional measures could also be taken by the legislature,
without detriment to the rights of litigants. Retention of cases
under such statutes as the Federal Employers' Liability Act"' has
155. REP. ON REV. FED. Jun. Sys., supra note 80, at 14.
156. A.L.I., STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETIVEEN STATE AND FEDERAL
COURTS 101 (1969). For a discussion of other factors relevant to the origin of the diversity
jurisdiction, see D. CURUE, THE FEDERAL COURTS 437-38 (1975).
157. Burdick, Diversity Jurisdiction Under the American Law Institute Proposals: Its
Purpose and Effect on State and Federal Courts, 48 N. DAY. L. REv. 1, 14-15 (1971).
There is an increasing body of literature addressing the diversity issue. A number of
commentators advocate removing most, if not all, diversity cases from the federal courts.
See, e.g., H. FRIENDLY, supra note 34, at 139-52; Bork, supra note 48, at 236-37; Burger,
Annual Report on the State of the Judiciary, 62 A.B.A.J. 443 (1976); Currie, The Federal
Courts and the American Law Institute, 36 U. CHm. L. REv. 1, 4-6 (1968). But see, e.g.,
Frank, Let's Keep. Diversity Jurisdiction, 9 FoRum 157 (1973); Frank, For Maintaining
Diversity Jurisdiction, 73 YALE L.J. 7 (1963). One recent commentator argues that each
federal district court should be given "limited freedom to retain, curtail or virtually elimi-
nate diversity jurisdiction within its borders." Shapiro, Federal Diversity Jurisdiction: A
Survey and a Proposal, 91 HARv. L. REV. 317, 319 (1977).
158. 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1970). FELA provides a cause of action for employees injured
by railroad employers engaged in interstate commerce. Actions brought under the Act
may be maintained in federal district or state courts. 45 U.S.C. § 56 (1970).
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been described as "sheer antiquarianism." -9 Similarly, the require-
ment that the National Labor Relations Board petition the courts
of appeals to enforce Board orders has been criticized as an un-
necessary administrative step; Board orders could be made self-
enforcing, unless the aggrieved party immediately initiates a review
proceeding. 160 It has been estimated that this change in National
Labor Relations Board procedure would reduce the Labor Board
caseload in the federal appeals courts by one-half. 10'
G. Litigation Impact Statement
The forces that have propelled the judiciary into its present
central role as society's dispute-solver are, as indicated in Section II,
elusive and complex. Increased public awareness of legal remedies,
greater availability of attorneys to the not-so-wealthy, judicial ex-
pansion of individual rights, and changes in social institutions are
all factors. However, the single factor that can be most objectively
measured and evaluated is the passage of litigation-generating
legislation. It is therefore of crucial importance to fashion a remedy
that takes this reality into account.
Proposed legislation should, at the time that it is discharged
from committee for consideration by Congress or a state legislature,
be accompanied by a litigation impact statement assessing the effect
of the bill's passage on judicial administration. 2 Such an assess-
ment should address four questions. First, what is the necessity of
new legislation; is there a widespread economic or social problem
that cannot be met under existing law? Second, what is the volume
of litigation that can be predicted as a result of the proposed statute,
including both broad challenges to its constitutionality and mean-
ing, and suits authorized by its provisions? Third, has the legislature
159. Friendly, supra note 4, at 640.
160. See H. FRIENDLY, supra note 34, at 174-75; 1 RECOMMENDATIONS AND REFORTS OF
THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 237-67 (1970).
161. See, e.g., H. FRIENDLY, supra note 34, at 174-75.
162. Unlike the environmental impact statements required by the National Environ-
mental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (2) (c) (1970), such litigation impact appraisals
may not form the basis for lawsuits seeking to block enforcement of the underlying statute.
The legislation requiring litigation impact assessments should contain a statement to this
effect. The purpose of requiring impact statements would be to compel Congress and state
legislatures to ameliorate the effect of new statutes on judicial administration, not to foster
roadblocks to legislative problem-solving. On the current obstacles to enacting legislation,
see M. JEWELL & S. PATTERSON, THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS IN THE UNITED STATES 476-506 (2d




fully explored the possibility of enforcing the statute administra-
tively rather than judicially? Finally, has the legislative proposal
been drafted so as to eliminate technical problems that could be
the object of a lawsuit, such as vagueness, and all other litigation-
generating provisions that are not important to its goals?
Because the success of this four-step requirement will depend
in part on the ability to predict the litigation potential of legislation,
it would necessitate a sophisticated study of the kinds of cases that
arise out of new legislation, and that presently engage a substantial
portion of the judiciary's time.
CONCLUSION
Neither creation of new judicial doctrines, such as additional
limits on standing, nor the development of further specialized
courts dealing with only one subject matter are appropriate
methods of meeting the problem of mushrooming caseloads. Ap-
pointment of more judges to existing courts is only one remedy in
the composite solution advocated herein. Elimination of diversity
jurisdiction, and further diversion of disputes to mediation and
arbitration for voluntary agreement or at least for screening pur-
poses, are also essential. Finally, the establishment of administrative
tribunals with jurisdiction over repetitious factual issues arising
from a pool of specified statutes and the requirement of a litigation
impact statement to accompany legislation that may create new
causes of action should be undertaken at both federal and state
levels.
Some of these solutions concern problem-solving outside the
litigation context and have the advantage of drawing on consensus
rather than relying on compulsion. Ultimately, our capacity to
develop such solutions must be strengthened. As Eugen Ehrlich
reminds us, "[t]he order of human society is based upon the fact
that, in general, legal duties are being performed, not upon the fact
that failure to perform gives rise to a cause of action." 163
163. E. EHRLICH, FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE SOCIOLOGY OF THE LAW 23 (1936).
Eugen Ehrlich was a distinguished Austrian jurist and professor of law.
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